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O P I N I O N  
   
RENDELL, Circuit Judge:  
Michael Scripps appeals the denial of his motion for 
relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, urging that the District 
Court should have held an evidentiary hearing to determine 
whether his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
raise a claim that the sentencing judge did not personally 
address him during sentencing, as required by Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 32.  For the following reasons, we 
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conclude that the District Court abused its discretion in failing 
to conduct an evidentiary hearing.  We will therefore remand 
to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.   
 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Background 
A jury convicted Scripps on seven counts of wire fraud 
for fraudulently transferring millions of dollars from the bank 
accounts of his mother and autistic uncle—heirs to the family’s 
publishing fortune—into his own account.  During the 
sentencing hearing, the District Court heard arguments from 
both parties’ counsel.  The District Court indicated that Scripps 
was invited to address the Court multiple times throughout the 
hearing, but it never personally asked Scripps if he wished to 
speak.  For example, while addressing Scripps’s attorney, Mr. 
Michael Dezsi, the sentencing judge stated:   
 
I haven’t heard acknowledgement just yet—
maybe we’ll get there—of [Scripps’s] own 
responsibility for the choices that he has made.  
 . . . Scripps is not, in my eyes, a victim of 
circumstances. He’s an intelligent, thoughtful 
man who has made his choices for the reasons he 
has made his choices. And he can tell me about 
them if he wants. 
 
App. 89-90 (emphasis added).  
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The sentencing judge later explicitly asked Mr. Dezsi 
whether Scripps wished to address the court, and Mr. Dezsi 
indicated that he would confer with Scripps:  
 
The Court:  Does [Scripps] want to talk to me? 
Mr. Dezsi:  I’m sorry? 
The Court:   Does he want to speak to me? 
Mr. Dezsi:  Your Honor, I’m going to confer with 
my client before we do that. 
The Court:   Sure. Go ahead. 
 
App. 103-04.  The sentencing judge then directed Mr. Dezsi 
to ask Scripps whether he wished to make a statement:  
 
The Court:   Okay. You need to speak with [Scripps] 
about whether he wishes to speak to me.  
But I’ll hear from the government first.  
Mr. Dezsi:    Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.   
App. 104.  Before imposing his sentence, the sentencing 
judge again asked Mr. Dezsi if Scripps wished to speak.  Mr. 
Dezsi informed the sentencing judge that Scripps did not wish 
to exercise his right to allocution.   
 
[The Court:]  Does he want to speak to me, sir? 
Mr. Dezsi: Your Honor, having discussed it—the 
matter with my client, he’s opting not to 
address the court, Your Honor. He will 
not be making a statement. 
The Court: Okay. That’s fine.  
 
App. 119.  After hearing from the parties, the sentencing judge 
concluded that “[t]here’s nothing in this record from which I 
could fairly conclude there’s any remorse whatsoever.”  App. 
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124.  The District Court then sentenced Scripps to 108 months’ 
imprisonment, the maximum period of incarceration within the 
advisory Guidelines range, and three years’ supervised release, 
the maximum term of supervised release permitted under 18 
U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2). 
 
 B. Procedural History   
Scripps appealed his sentence, and he was again 
represented by Mr. Dezsi on appeal.  Scripps raised several 
issues on direct appeal, including “the District Court’s 
supplemental jury instructions, the impartiality of members of 
the prosecution team, the exclusion of certain expert testimony, 
and the reasonableness of his sentence.”  United States v. 
Scripps, 599 F. App’x 443, 444 (3d Cir. 2015).  We found no 
error and affirmed.  Id. at 448. 
 
Scripps then filed a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C § 
2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence, raising several 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  The District Court 
appointed habeas counsel to represent Scripps, and thereafter, 
Scripps withdrew his pro se motion, and his appointed counsel 
filed an amended motion.  Scripps’s amended motion raises 
several issues, including whether his appellate counsel was 
ineffective in failing to argue that the trial judge erred by not 
personally inviting Scripps to speak during sentencing.1  
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) (“Rule 32”) 
requires a sentencing judge to “address the defendant 
 
1 Scripps alleged six other claims for relief, all related to the 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  These claims are not at 
issue on appeal. 
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personally in order to permit the defendant to speak or present 
any information to mitigate the sentence.” 
 
The District Court determined that there was no Rule 32 
error because the trial court “afforded [Scripps] an opportunity 
to speak several times during sentencing,” and thus Scripps 
“was able to exercise his rights under Rule 32.”  App. 16-17.  
Because counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise an 
issue on appeal where there was no underlying error, see 
Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 121 n.7 (3d Cir. 2009), the 
District Court concluded that an evidentiary hearing was 
unnecessary and denied Scripps’s § 2255 motion.   
Scripps timely filed a notice of appeal and requested a 
certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1).  We 
granted a certificate of appealability on one issue: “whether the 
District Court erred in denying, without an evidentiary hearing, 
the claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
raise a claim that the District Court did not personally address 
Appellant at sentencing.”  App. 20 (internal citation omitted).  
During the pendency of this appeal, Scripps was released from 
prison and has since been serving his term of three years’ 
supervised release.  
II. JURISDICTION  
We must first address the threshold issue of whether this 
case was rendered moot upon Scripps’s release from prison.2  
Under Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution, federal courts 
 
2 Although the parties agree that this case presents a live case 
or controversy, we have an independent duty to analyze this 
jurisdictional requirement before proceeding to our analysis on 
the merits.   
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are limited to adjudicating “actual, ongoing cases or 
controversies.”  Khodara Envtl., Inc. ex rel. Eagle Envtl., L.P., 
237 F.3d 186, 192-93 (3d Cir. 2001) (Alito, J.).  A court’s 
ability to grant effective relief is central to the mootness 
doctrine.  See County of Morris v. Nationalist Movement, 273 
F.3d 527, 533 (3d Cir. 2001).   
“[A] live case or controversy that a court can remedy 
arises when a defendant challenges the sentence he is currently 
serving . . . .”  United States v. Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 241 (3d 
Cir. 2008).  Here, Scripps challenges the validity of his 
sentence, which includes his term of imprisonment and his 
term of supervised release.  See App. 125-26 (“So the total 
period of confinement on the bills is 108 months total. . . . And 
that will be followed by three years supervised release.”); see 
also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) (“The court, in imposing a sentence 
to a term of imprisonment for a felony or a misdemeanor, may 
include as a part of the sentence a requirement that the 
defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after 
imprisonment . . . .” (emphasis added)).  Although Scripps has 
completed his period of imprisonment, he is currently serving 
his term of supervised release.  Accordingly, because Scripps 
is directly challenging “the sentence he is currently serving, 
issues of mootness do not arise.”  Jackson, 523 F.3d at 241.3   
 
3 One of our precedents appears to suggest that this case is 
moot.  In Burkey v. Marberry, the petitioner, who was 
challenging his exclusion from a program that would have 
qualified him for early release, had already been released from 
prison.  556 F.3d 142, 144-45 (3d Cir. 2009).  His only hope of 
relief was that the sentencing court might compensate for his 
extra time in prison by reducing his supervised release term.  
See id. at 146.  We held that the case was moot because he 
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We therefore have jurisdiction to review this matter 
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2255(d).4   
III. DISCUSSION 
Scripps argues that the District Court erred in denying 
his request for an evidentiary hearing as to his claim that his 
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the trial 
court’s Rule 32 error on direct appeal.  We review the District 
Court’s failure to grant an evidentiary hearing for abuse of 
discretion.  See United States v. Lilly, 536 F.3d 190, 195 (3d 
Cir. 2008), holding modified on other grounds by Vickers v. 
Superintendent Graterford SCI, 858 F.3d 841 (3d Cir. 2017).  
We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s legal 
conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous standard to its 
 
could not show that it was “likely” that the sentencing court 
would award him that reduction.  Id. at 149-50 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
Burkey is distinguishable for the reason given in the text: the 
petitioner there challenged only his prison sentence, while here 
Scripps challenges his entire sentence (including the 
supervised-release portion).  In any event, our logic in Burkey 
appears to have been superseded by more recent Supreme 
Court case law, which clarifies that a case is not moot if there 
is any theoretical avenue of relief.  See, e.g., Mission Prod. 
Holdings v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652, 1660 (2019) 
(explaining that a case is moot “only if ‘it is impossible for a 
court to grant any effectual relief whatever’” to the prevailing 
party) (emphases added) (quoting Chafin v. Chafin, 567 U.S. 
165, 173 (2013)). 
4 The District Court had jurisdiction over Scripps’s § 2255 
motion under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  
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factual findings.  See Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 512 
(3d Cir. 1997).   
A district court must hold an evidentiary hearing 
“[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case 
conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.”  
United States v. McCoy, 410 F.3d 124, 131 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255).  Thus, “the District Court’s 
decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing will be an abuse of 
discretion unless it can be conclusively shown that [Scripps] 
cannot make out a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.”  
Lilly, 536 F.3d at 195.   
 A. Strickland Test  
A criminal defendant has a right to the effective 
assistance of appellate counsel on the first appeal as of 
right.  Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396-97 (1985).  To assess 
the performance of appellate counsel, we apply the two-prong 
test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  
See United States v. Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 315 n.12 (3d Cir. 
2002).  Under Strickland, a petitioner must first establish that 
counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness.”  466 U.S. at 688.  In making this 
determination, Strickland cautioned that courts should be 
“highly deferential” when assessing counsel’s performance 
and requires courts to “indulge a strong presumption that 
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance.”  Id. at 689.  Second, a petitioner must 
show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient 
performance, meaning that “there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.”  Id. at 694.   
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Scripps argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective 
in failing to raise the trial court’s failure to personally address 
him during sentencing.  He further argues that he was 
prejudiced by his appellate counsel’s deficient performance 
because, if this issue had been raised on direct appeal, we 
would have remanded for resentencing instead of affirming the 
trial court’s sentence.  We will analyze each argument under 
the Strickland test to determine whether the record 
conclusively shows that Scripps is not entitled to habeas relief.5  
 
 i. Objective Standard of Reasonableness 
In order to determine whether appellate counsel’s 
performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness, we must analyze whether a Rule 32 error even 
exists.  If there was no underlying error, then appellate counsel 
 
5 In Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962), the Supreme 
Court held that a defendant does not have a constitutional right 
to allocution, and therefore cannot collaterally attack his 
sentence under Rule 32 absent aggravating circumstances.  Id. 
at 428.  However, in contrast to the petitioner in Hill, who 
solely alleged that he had been denied the right to allocution, 
Scripps alleges that he was denied the right to the effective 
assistance of appellate counsel under the Sixth Amendment.  
Thus, although the underlying error concerns a Rule 32 
violation, Scripps presents a cognizable claim under § 2255.  
See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 383 (1986) 
(holding that a claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
is cognizable on habeas review where the petitioner alleged 
that his trial counsel failed to raise a meritorious argument to 
exclude evidence seized in an unconstitutional search).    
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was not ineffective for failing to raise this issue on appeal.  See 
Thomas, 570 F.3d at 121 n.7.  
Rule 32 protects a defendant’s right to allocution.  
Specifically, the rule requires that courts “address the 
defendant personally in order to permit the defendant to speak 
or present any information to mitigate the sentence.”  Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) (emphasis added).  The Supreme Court 
has unequivocally instructed courts to “leave no room for 
doubt that the defendant has been issued a personal invitation 
to speak prior to sentencing.”  Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 
301, 305 (1961).  Recognizing the long history of the common 
law right of allocution, the Supreme Court stated in Green that 
“there can be little doubt that the drafters of Rule 32[] 
intended that the defendant be personally afforded the 
opportunity to speak before imposition of 
sentence.”  Id. at 304.6   
We applied this rule in United States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 
276 (3d Cir. 2001), holding that Rule 32 is not satisfied if the 
sentencing judge asks the defendant’s attorney if the defendant 
wishes to speak, but fails to address the defendant himself.  
There, the trial judge made clear that the defendant was invited 
to address the court, telling the defendant’s lawyer, “I want to 
hear if the remorseful defendant has anything he wants to say.”  
Id. at 278.  After hearing arguments from defense counsel, the 
 
6 The current wording in Rule 32, which requires the court to 
“address the defendant personally” before imposing its 
sentence, was adopted in response to the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Green.  See Fed. R. Crim P. 32, advisory committee’s 
note to 1966 amendment; United States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 
276, 279 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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trial judge specifically asked the defendant’s attorney: “Would 
your client like to exercise his right of allocution?”  Id.  “After 
a pause,” the defendant’s lawyer replied, “No.”  Id.  We noted 
that while the trial judge was “obviously aware of [the 
defendant’s] right of allocution,” “the Supreme Court has held 
that this query, directed towards counsel, does not satisfy the 
requirement that the district court personally address the 
defendant himself.”  Id. at 279.  We therefore held that the 
district court failed to comply with Rule 32.  Id.  
The Government attempts to distinguish this case as 
“that rare matter” where, although the sentencing judge did not 
directly address Scripps, the record reflects that Scripps 
nonetheless knew he could exercise his right to allocution.  
Gov’t Br. 23.  Both the District Court’s opinion and the 
Government reason that, unlike in Adams, the trial judge 
directed Scripps’s attorney to ask Scripps if he wished to speak 
and, after conferring with his client, Scripps’s attorney 
confirmed that he did not.7  The Government argues this is the 
“functional equivalent” of personally addressing Scripps.  
Gov’t Br. 24.  We find this reasoning unpersuasive. 
As we held in Adams, an invitation to speak directed 
through defense counsel is not an adequate substitute for a 
personal invitation to the defendant himself.  Our controlling 
law and the text of Rule 32 make clear that courts must 
personally address the defendant and that no substitute for such 
a personal address will be permitted.  Accordingly, we find that 
the trial court erred in failing to personally address Scripps 
before imposing its sentence.   
 
 
7 The District Court noted that “[i]n sharp contrast [to Adams], 
in this case, not only did counsel confer with defendant on the 
record, but he was directed by the Court to do so.”  App. 17.   
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Thus, it is possible that appellate counsel’s failure to 
raise the Rule 32 error on direct appeal “fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness” under Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.  
See Goff v. Bagley, 601 F.3d 445, 466 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Failure 
on the part of [] appellate counsel to raise such an obviously 
winning claim clearly falls below an objective standard of 
reasonableness . . . .”).  However, without understanding 
counsel’s reasons for failing to raise this error on appeal, we 
cannot categorically conclude that appellate counsel fell below 
an objective standard of reasonableness.  See Marshall v. 
Hendricks, 307 F.3d 36, 115 (3d Cir. 2002) (concluding that 
the objective standard of reasonableness analysis “needs to be 
made with an understanding of counsel’s thought process”).  
This is because we cannot presume that counsel’s failure to 
raise the Rule 32 error on appeal automatically constitutes 
deficient performance.  Rather, courts must “indulge a strong 
presumption” that counsel was effective and may only find 
otherwise if the defendant “overcome[s] the presumption that . 
. . the challenged action might be considered sound trial 
strategy.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).   
 
 ii. Prejudice 
Even assuming counsel fell below an objective standard 
of reasonableness, we would not grant habeas relief if the 
defendant suffered no prejudice.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
694.  Where a petitioner challenges the validity of his sentence 
under § 2255, “[t]he test for prejudice under Strickland is not 
whether petitioners would likely prevail upon remand, but 
whether we would have likely reversed and ordered a remand 
had the issue been raised on direct appeal.”  United States v. 
Mannino, 212 F.3d 835, 844 (3d Cir. 2000).   
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Scripps challenged his sentence on direct appeal, but we 
found no error based upon the issues raised and affirmed his 
sentence.  See Scripps, 599 F. App’x 443.  We must therefore 
determine if there is a reasonable probability that Scripps’s 
direct appeal would have come out differently if appellate 
counsel had raised the Rule 32 error.   
In Adams, the defendant challenged the Rule 32 error on 
direct appeal, and we applied a plain-error standard of review.  
252 F.3d at 278.  We held that prejudice is presumed where the 
defendant demonstrates the “opportunity for such a [Rule 32] 
violation to have played a role in the district court’s sentencing 
decision.”  Id. at 287.  We reasoned that the Rule 32 error 
played a role during sentencing because the defendant was 
sentenced “roughly in the middle of the applicable Guidelines 
range, and therefore the District Court clearly retained 
discretion to grant [the defendant] a lower sentence.”  Id. 
(citation omitted).  Similarly, here, the sentencing judge 
sentenced Scripps to a period of imprisonment at the top of the 
Guidelines range and to the maximum period of supervised 
release, and therefore retained discretion to grant Scripps a 
lower sentence.  Applying Adams’s view of plain-error 
prejudice, we find that there is a reasonable probability that we 
would have remanded for resentencing if counsel had raised 
the Rule 32 error on direct appeal.  Accordingly, prejudice is 
satisfied under Strickland for Scripps’s ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim.  See Mannino, 212 F.3d at 845.    
B. Evidentiary Hearing 
As we noted above, the record does not conclusively 
show that Scripps is not entitled to habeas relief for his 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim.  We cannot 
determine whether counsel’s conduct fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness for, while it would be highly 
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unusual for counsel to omit such a clearly meritorious 
argument, nonetheless counsel may have had reasons for doing 
so.8  But without an evidentiary hearing, we do not know 
whether counsel had strategic reasons for failing to raise this 
error on appeal, and therefore, we cannot conclude as a matter 
of law that counsel was ineffective.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 681 (noting that “strategic choices must be respected” and 
will “seldom if ever be found wanting” (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted)).  Accordingly, we find that the 
District Court abused its discretion in summarily denying 
Scripps’s § 2255 motion without conducting an evidentiary 
hearing, and we will remand to the District Court for further 
proceedings. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s Order denying Scripps’s § 2255 motion as to this claim 
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.   
 
8 For example, perhaps Scripps informed counsel that he did 
not intend to allocute even if he were resentenced, and 
therefore counsel determined that raising the Rule 32 error 
would not be beneficial.  Counsel may also have anticipated 
that the defendant would show no remorse and would argue 
with the jury’s verdict on resentencing, causing the Judge, who 
was already perturbed at defense counsel for making excuses 
for Scripps’s embezzlement and blaming others, to find a way 
to impose an even greater sentence on Scripps.  
 
